Logistik Produksi

Istilah ini dipakai untuk menggambarkan proses logistik di dalam sebuah industri. Tujuan logistik produksi adalah memastikan bahwa tiap mesin dan stasiun-kerja dipasok dengan produk yang cocok dalam jumlah dan mutu yang cocok pada waktu yang cocok

Masalah bukan hanya transportasi itu sendiri tetapi memuluskan dan mengendalikan aliran melalui proses nilai-tambah dan menghilangkan proses tanpa nilai-tambah. Logistik produksi dapat diterapkan pada pabrik yang baru dan yang sedang berjalan. Proses manufaktur pada pabrik yang sedang berjalan merupakan proses yang terus berubah. Mesin berganti dan datang mesin baru sehingga ada peluang untuk memperbaiki sistem logistik produksi yang sesuai. Logistik produksi dapat mendukung pemenuhan keinginan pelanggan dan efisiensi modal.

Logistik produksi menjadi lebih penting dengan menurunnya ukuran batch. Pada banyak industri (misalnya telepon genggam) ukuran batch satu merupakan sasaran jangka pendek. Dengan cara ini permintaan seorang pelanggan pun dapat dipenuhi dengan efektif. Lacak dan telusur, yang merupakan bagian utama logistik produksi — karena masalah keamanan dan keandalan produk — juga semakin penting terutama pada industri otomotif dan kesehatan.

Non-Muslims in Muslim Societies

The Right of Protection
In Islam, the primary right of the People of the Book is to be protected and safeguarded against any foreign aggression, and Muslims are compelled to protect them in the event such a transgression falls against them. Al-Qaradawi bases his standpoint about this on jurisprudential texts and the position of Imam Ibn Taymiyah (may Allah have mercy on him) while speaking to Qultoo Shaha Tartar regarding the freeing of prisoners of war (POWs). Qultoo Shah agreed to set Muslim POWs free upon Ibn Taymiah’s request; however, the latter insisted that Christian POWs be released with the Muslims, which was what happened in the end. This stand by Ibn Taymiyah reflects the perspective of jurisprudence on the subject of the right to external protection. The Muslim state must also defend minorities against internal injustice or oppression, such that they cannot be subject to any form of wrongdoing by the state or its sponsors; and overlapping evidence from the Qur’an and the Sunnah clearly prohibits any sort of injustice against noncombatant non-Muslims living peacefully within a Muslim state. To this effect, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) was reported to have said, “He who unfairly treats a non-Muslim who keeps a peace treaty with Muslims, or undermines his rights, or burdens him beyond his capacity, or takes something from him without his consent; then I am his opponent on the Day of Judgment” (Abu Dawud and Al-Bayhaqi). He (peace and blessings be upon him) is also reported to have said, ?He who harms a non-Muslim who keeps a peace treaty with Muslims has harmed me, and he who harms me has harmed Allah” (At-Tabarani in Al-Awsat with a good chain of transmission). Not only was this the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) on the issue, but the Rightly Guided Caliphs also practiced this, with several authentic incidents to this effect reported by `Umar ibn Al-Khattab and `Ali ibn Abi Talib. Types of Protection Protection of body and blood. Al-Qaradawi asserts the consensus among scholars to protect the blood of non-Muslim minorities living within a Muslim state, and he explains that violating their blood is considered one of the gravest of sins. This is due to the hadith by the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him): “He who kills a non-Muslim who keeps a peace treaty with the Muslims will not smell the scent of Heaven, though its scent can be traced to as far as a march of 40 years” (Imam Ahmad and Al-Bukhari in Al-Jizyah, among others). Although scholars have differed over the issue of exchanging the life of a Muslim for that of a Dhimmi (a noncombatant non-Muslim who keeps a peace treaty with the Muslims and lives within a Muslim society), yet Al-Qaradawi sides with the opinion that says a Muslim can be killed if he wrongfully murders a Dhimmi with no right. He founds his view on this matter on texts from the Quran and the Sunnah that underline the principle of retribution and reprisal (qisaas). This was also the view endorsed and exercised by the Ottoman caliphate in all the regions and provinces falling under its jurisdiction for centuries, until the Muslim empire fell prey to its enemies and was knocked down.

Protection of Money and Property
This principle has been unanimously agreed upon among all Muslims of all sects throughout history. Moreover, Islam regards whatever property or money considered by non-Muslims as valuables according to their faiths and pledges to protect them, even if they pose no real value to Muslims. Liquor and swine are an example of this, where they cannot be considered as money to Muslims; and if a Muslim squanders or spoils such property of another Muslim, he could not be called upon for compensation; yet if a Muslim spoils such assets belonging to a non-Muslim, he would be responsible for compensation, according to Imam Abu Hanifah.

Protection of Honor.
The honor of Dhimmis is sacred in Islam, similar to that of Muslims. Imam Al-Qarafi Al-Maliki once said on this note, “He who transgresses against them (Dhimmis) even with a mere word of injustice or backtalk has jeopardized the covenant with Allah and His Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and the covenant of the religion of Islam” (Al-Furuq Part 3, p. 14). Moreover, there exist abundant additional texts to the same effect.

Social Welfare Against Disability, Old Age, and Poverty

Islam guarantees non-Muslims living under its societal umbrella their necessary welfare benefits, which enables them to live decently and support those they sponsor, since they are considered among the Muslim state?s subjects or citizens. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) was reported to have said, “You are all sponsors and (thus) responsible for those you sponsor” (Ibn `Umar). The Rightly Guided Caliphs and those who succeeded them continued to implement these policies towards non-Muslims living within the Muslim community. During the caliphate of Abu Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him), Khalid ibn Al-Waleed sent a letter to the non-Muslim population of Al-Hira in Iraq at the time, assuring them that none of their rights were to be undermined by the Muslim army’s procession in their direction. `Umar ibn Al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him) was also reported to have seen a senile Jewish man asking for alms, and hence took him to the treasury and authorized a monthly pension for him and the likes of him. By this, Abu Bakr and `Umar had jointly formulated a social welfare legislation for Muslims as well as non-Muslims, which was then unanimously picked up by all Islamic sects.

The Right to Freedom of Belief

Additionally, Islam does not force Dhimmis to embrace Islam and recognizes their freedom to choose their own faith. This freedom is stressed in the following Quranic verses: [Let there be no compulsion in religion: truth stands out clear from error] (Al-Baqarah 2:256) and [Wilt thou (Muhammad) then compel mankind, against their will, to believe!] (Yunus 10:99). History does not deny this fact about Islam, nor do Westerners. Islam, throughout history, has safeguarded and protected houses of worship for non-Muslims and sanctified their religious rituals. When the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) wrote the peace treaty to the people of Najran, he asserted to them that they should receive the protection of Allah and His Prophet on their property, faith, and choices. Similarly, `Umar’s letter to the people of Iliya in Palestine, upon the Muslim conquest, promised them the liberty to choose the faith they deemed appropriate; in addition there are analogous accounts attributed to Khalid ibn Al-Waleed. Permitting non-Muslims to build their own houses of worship in towns mainly populated by Muslims also falls under this scope, where early in Muslim history several churches were built in Egypt during the first Hijri century. An example of this is the construction of the Mar Marcus Church in Alexandria (between AH 39 and 56), and the construction of the first church in Fustat in the Roman Alley during the reign of Maslamah ibn Mikhled (between the years AH 47 and 68). Ruler Abdul `Aziz ibn Marwan also authorized constructing a church in Helwan while founding the city, besides allowing a number of bishops to erect hermitage cells. Historian Al-Maqrizi once said, “All modern day Cairo churches were undoubtedly restored in Islam.” As for the villages and areas which are not considered among the Muslim provinces, non-Muslims were not repressed against practicing and illustrating their religious rituals, including the renovation of old churches and cathedrals, and were free to expand building such houses of worship as their population grew. This form of religious tolerance is strictly a bread of Islam, as the infamous French scholar Gustave Le Bon once said (as al-Qaradawi quotes him in his book), From the verses of the Quran we previously mentioned, we find that Muhammad’s forgiveness towards the Jews and the Christians was ultimately phenomenal; and such tolerance was unprecedented by the founders of other religions, such as Judaism and Christianity in particular. We shall also see how his successors followed in his footsteps on this path. Other Europeans also paralleled such discourse, such as Robertson and others.

The Right to Work and Earn Profits

Islam has guaranteed to non-Muslims living under its umbrella the right to engage in any form of commercial activities, including buying, selling, leasing, and otherwise, with the exception of exercising riba (taking interest on loans, etc.). This rule was derived from a letter from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) to the Magians of Hajar, where he said, “You may choose between neglecting riba or facing war with Allah and His Prophet.” The selling of liquor and swine in Muslim provinces are also to be added to the list of the impermissible; otherwise, non-Muslims may practice any form of commercial activities. Adam Mitz, as al-Qaradawi sites, once said Islamic jurisprudence does not forbid Dhimmis from entering any field of labor they choose, and they were well-established in trades which yield large profits; excelling as bankers, landlords, and doctors. Moreover, they managed to organize themselves, such that the most prominent bankers in the Levant (Syrian and Palestine) were Jews, whilst the best physicians and writers were Christians, and the chief of the Christian population in Baghdad was the caliph’s personal doctor, as the caliph also gathered in his court the chiefs and heads of the Jewish population.

The Right to Occupy State Ranks

Islam did not prohibit Dhimmis from occupying state positions, since it perceived them as an integral part of the state fabric. Islam also did not encourage their isolation, and the People of the Book were allowed to join all offices apart from those marked with a religious trait; for example, the imamate, leadership of the state and the army, judge of disputes between Muslims, administrator of the dispensing of charity and alms. The imamate, or caliphate, is a senior leading position in both the mundane world and the religious, a succession of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him); and, obviously, such ranks could not be open to non-Muslims. Similarly, the leadership of the army cannot be considered a purely civil duty, since it is strongly related with jihad, which tops the ladder of Islamic duties. Moreover, the judiciary is operated through Islamic jurisprudence, and non-Muslims cannot be asked to carry out the rules of a doctrine they do not believe in. The guardianship over alms and charity also falls under the scope of Islamic duties and logically could not be entrusted to the disposal of the non-Muslim minority within the Muslim state. Other than the above, all state offices were always open to Dhimmis on condition that they fulfilled the necessary requirements and prerequisites for the positions applied for; that is, integrity, honesty, and loyalty to the state. This is to assure that these sensitive posts be entrusted to faithful individuals, other than those Muslims are warned against in the following verse: [O ye who believe! Take not into your intimacy those outside your ranks: they will not fail to corrupt you. They only desire your ruin: rank hatred has already appeared from their mouths: what their hearts conceal is far worse. We have made plain to you the Signs, if ye have wisdom] (Aal `Imran 3:118). Imam Al-Mawardi even authorized Dhimmis to undertake executive ministries rather than delegate ministries. Executive ministers are those who implement and execute the imam?s orders. Conversely, delegate ministries are those which the imam entrusts to the minister to devise certain political, administrative, and economic matters according to his own personal judgment. During the Abbasid era, Christians undertook the ministry more than once; for example, Nasr ibn Haroun in AH 369 and Eissa ibn Nastorus in AH 380. Mu`awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan had also appointed a Christian clerk named Sarjoun. Perhaps Muslim tolerance in this regard was sometimes taken too far, where at some instances, the rights of Muslims themselves were undermined and some skeptics complained about the undeserved prestigious authority of Jews and Christians above them. Western historian Adam Mitz says in his book Islamic Civilization in the Fourth Hijri Century, “We find it very surprising the abundance of non-Muslim laborers and senior staff within the Muslim state; where Christians governed Muslims in Muslim provinces, and complaints against non-Muslims’ seniority in these provinces dates far back” (part 1, p. 105).

Prophetic Recommendations

Particularly for Egyptian Copts Al-Qaradawi finds that Egyptian Copts in particular have a distinguished position among other non-Muslim minorities, given the prophetic narrations to that effect. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) was reported to have said on his deathbed, “By Allah, respect the Copts of Egypt, for you shall conquer them, and they shall be your supporters in the cause of Allah” (At-Tabarani). In another hadith, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said, “Treat them well, for they are an asset to you and a warning against your enemies by the Will of Allah.” Reference here is made to Egyptian Copts (Ibn Hibban). Historical reality has lived up to the Prophet’s prophecies, where Egyptian Copts welcomed the Muslim conquerors, who saved them from the persecution they suffered under the Romans, who had taken up another sect of Christianity. The Copts started entering Islam in large numbers, to the extent that some rulers of the Umayyad dynasty mistakenly enforced the jizyah among some Copts who had already embraced Islam. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) attributed certain rights to Egyptian Copts that he did not grant to other minorities, where Ka`b ibn Malik narrates from the Prophet, “If Egypt is conquered, treat the Copts with dignity, for they have a blood relation with us.” Connotation is made here to the mother of the Prophet Isma`il, Hajar, who was an Egyptian (Reported by At-Tabarani and Al-Hakim).

Loyalty Guarantees

Moreover, Islam adds to the rights of minorities by laying down a number of guarantees to live up to these rights. Among the most important of these is the right to believe. Such rights are clearly defined in the Quran and the Prophetic Sunnah, and their practice falls under the correct practice of Islam. These rights are also protected by the Muslim society, which is founded on accurate implementation of Islamic jurisprudence, including the rights of the People of the Book according to Islamic principles. Any Dhimmi who feels that he has been treated unjustly has the right to appeal to the ruler to reverse the injustice against him, either by a Muslim or a non-Muslim. Scholars and the general Islamic conscience are another defense line for non-Muslims to seek protection behind. Islamic history is full of incidents that indicate the Muslim community’s commitment to protect Dhimmis against any depreciation of their rights. Islamic history reports the case of the priest who complained against an army leader who wrongfully took his money to Ahmad ibn Tulun, who then had it returned to the priest. There is also the case of the Copt who complained against `Amr ibn Al-`Aas to `Umar, who summoned the latter into account. The role of scholars in this regard can clearly be detected in the stance of Imam Al-Awza`i towards the Abbasid ruler during his time, when the ruler kicked out a non-Muslim tribe from Mount Lebanon after a group of them had refused to pay their yearly agricultural tax. Al-Awza`i wrote on this matter to the caliph, denouncing the act and reminding him that Dhimmis were free people and not slaves. Furthermore, when Al-Waleed ibn `Abdul Malik confiscated Church John from the Christians and enjoined it to a mosque, they sought Caliph `Umar ibn `Abdul Aziz?s assistance to revoke the wrongdoing against them, which he did. The history of the Islamic judiciary bears witness to this, as was the case with `Ali ibn Abi Talib (may Allah be pleased with him) and others; which evidently proves that Islam renders the People of the Book as an integral part of society, not to be discriminated against by the Muslim population in any way.

    **Mass`oud Sabri is a researcher in Dar al-`Ulum Collage in Cairo University and an editor in IslamOnline.net, Arabic page. The works posted on this page reflect solely the opinions of the authors.
    Source: Non-Muslims in Muslim Societies: Contemporary Ijtihad The Rights of Non-Muslims in Society: A Reading of Al-Qaradawi Thought (Book Review) By Mass`oud Sabri ** December 5, 2005 Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi is among the most prominent Islamic figures who expressed early interest in the issue of the rights of non-Muslims in Muslim societies. Al-Qaradawi?s views on this topic are particularly important because of his academic and scholarly background, which indicates that his thoughts are directly an extension of jurisprudential proofs. Following are the most important rights deduced by Al-Qaradawi from his studies of religious texts and scholarly commentaries, from his important book on the subject Ghayr al-Muslmein fi el-Mujtama` al-Islami; Wahbah Pub., Cairo, 1997.

Islam and Evolution

Islam and Evolution*

By Nuh Ha Mim Keller **

November 21, 2005

An Arabic calligraphy work with embellishment.

During my logic of scientific explanation period at the University of Chicago, I used to think that scientific theories had to have coherence, logicality, applicability, and adequacy, and I was accustomed to examine theory statements by looking at these things in turn. Perhaps they furnish a reasonable point of departure to give the question on evolution an answer which, if cursory and somewhat personal, may yet shed some light on the issues you are asking about.


It seems to me that the very absoluteness of the theory?s conclusions tends to compromise its objective character. It is all very well to speak of the evidence of evolution, but if the theory is thorough-going, then human consciousness itself is also governed by evolution. This means that the categories that allow observation statements to arise as facts, categories such as number, space, time, event, measurement, logic, causality, and so forth, are mere physiological accidents of random mutation and natural selection in a particular species, Homo sapiens. They have not come from any scientific considerations, but rather have arbitrarily arisen in man by blind and fortuitous evolution for the purpose of preserving the species. They need not reflect external reality, ?the way nature is, objectively, but only to the degree useful in preserving the species. That is, nothing guarantees the primacy, the objectivity, of these categories over others that would have presumably arisen had our consciousness evolved along different lines, such as those of more distant, say, aquatic or subterranean species. The cognitive basis of every statement within the theory thus proceeds from the unreflective, unexamined historical forces that produced consciousness in one species, a cognitive basis that the theory nevertheless generalizes to the whole universe of theory statements (the explanation of the origin of species) without explaining what permits this generalization. The pretences of the theory to correspond to an objective order of reality, applicable in an absolute sense to all species, are simply not compatible with the consequences of a thoroughly evolutionary viewpoint, which entails that the human cognitive categories that underpin the theory are purely relative and species-specific. The absolutism of random mutation and natural selection as explanative principles ends in eating the theory. With all its statements simultaneously absolute and relative, objective and subjective, generalizable and ungeneralizable, scientific and species-specific, the theory runs up on a reef of methodological incoherence.


Speaking for myself, I was convinced that the evolution of man was an unchallengeable given of modern knowledge until I read Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species. The ninth chapter made it clear, from what Darwin modestly calls the great imperfection of the geological record that the theory was not in principle falsifiable, though the possibility that some kind of evidence or another should be able in principle to disprove a theory is a condition (if we can believe logicians like Karl Popper) for it to be considered scientific. By its nature, fossil evidence of intermediate forms that could prove or disprove the theory remained unfound and unfindable. When I read this, it was not clear to me how such an theory could be called scientific.

If evolution is not scientific, then what is it? It seems to me that it is a human interpretation, an endeavor, an industry, a literature, based on what the American philosopher Charles Peirce called abductive reasoning, which functions in the following way:

1. Surprising fact A.

2. If theory B were the case, then A would naturally follow.

3. Therefore B.

Here, (1) alone is certain; (2) is merely probable (as it explains the facts, though does not preclude other possible theories); while (3) has only the same probability as (2). If you want to see how ironclad the case for the evolution of man is, make a list of all the fossils discovered so far that prove the evolution of man from lower life forms, date them, and then ask yourself if abductive reasoning is not what urges it, and if it really precludes the possibility of quite a different (2) in place of the theory of evolution.


Is the analogy from micro-evolution within a species (which is fairly well-attested to by breeding horses, pigeons, useful plant hybrids, and so on) applicable to macro-evolution, from one species to another? That is, is there a single example of one species actually evolving into another, with the intermediate forms represented in the fossil record?

In the 1970s, Peter Williamson of Harvard University, under the direction of Richard Leakey, examined 3,300 fossils from digs around Lake Turkana, Kenya, spanning several million years of the history of thirteen species of mollusks, that seemed to provide clear evidence of evolution from one species to another. He published his findings five years later in Nature magazine, and Newsweek picked up the story:

Though their existence provides the basis for paleontology, fossils have always been something of an embarrassment to evolutionists. The problem is one of missing links: the fossil record is so littered with gaps that it takes a truly expert and imaginative eye to discern how one species could have evolved into another. But now, for the first time, excavations at Kenya’s Lake Turkana have provided clear fossil evidence of evolution from one species to another. The rock strata there contain a series of fossils that show every small step of an evolutionary journey that seems to have proceeded in fits and starts. (Begley and Carey)

Without dwelling on the facticity of scientific hypotheses raised under logic above, or that 3,300 fossils of thirteen species only cover several million years if we already acknowledge that evolution is happening and are merely trying to see where the fossils fit in, or that we are back to Peirce’s abductive reasoning here, although with a more probable minor premise because of the fuller geological record that is, even if we grant that evolution is the given which the fossils prove, an interesting point about the fossils (for a theist) is that the change was much more rapid than the traditional Darwinian mechanisms of random mutation and natural selection would warrant.

What the record indicated was that the animals stayed much the same for immensely long stretches of time. But twice, about 2 million years ago and then again 700,000 years ago, the pool of life seemed to explode set off, apparently, by a drop in the lake’s water level. In an instant of geologic time, as the changing lake environment allowed new types of mollusks to win the race for survival, all of the species evolved into varieties sharply different from their ancestors. Such sudden evolution had been observed before. What made the Lake Turkana fossil record unique, says Williamson, is that ?for the first time we see intermediate forms? between the old species and the new.

That intermediate forms appeared so quickly, with new species suddenly evolving in 5,000 to 50,000 years after millions of years of constancy, challenges the traditional theories of Darwin?s disciples. Most scientists describe evolution as a gradual process, in which random genetic mutations slowly produce new species. But the fossils of Lake Turkana don?t record any gradual change; rather, they seem to reflect eons of stasis interrupted by brief evolutionary ?revolutions? (Begley and Carey).

Of what significance is this to Muslims? In point of religion, if we put our scientific scruples aside for a moment and grant that evolution is applicable to something in the real world; namely, the mollusks of Lake Turkana, does this constitute unbelief (kufr) by the standards of Islam? I don?t think so. Classic works of Islamic `aqeedah or ?tenets of faith? such as Al-Matan as-Sanusiyya tell us, ?As for what is possible in relation to Allah, it consists of His doing or not doing anything that is possible? (As-Sanusi 145?146). That is, the omnipotent power of Allah can do anything that is not impossible, meaning either

1. Intrinsically impossible (mustahil dhati), such as creating a five-sided triangle, which is a mere confusion of words, and not something in any sense possible, such that we could ask whether Allah could do it;

2. Or else impossible because of Allah having informed us that it shall not occur (mustahil `aradi), whether He does so in the Qur?an, or through the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) in a mutawatir hadith, meaning one that has reached us through so many means of transmission that it is impossible its transmitters could have all conspired to forge it. This category of the impossible is not impossible to begin with, but becomes so by the revelation from Allah, Who is truthful and veracious. For example, it is impossible that Abu Lahab should be of the people of Paradise, because the Qur?an tells us he is of the people of Hell (Surat Al-Masad 111).

With respect to evolution, the knowledge claim that Allah has brought one sort of being out of another is not intrinsically impossible ((1) above) because it is not self-contradictory. And as to whether it is (2), ?impossible because of Allah having informed us that it cannot occur,? it would seem to me that we have two different cases, that of man, and that of the rest of creation.


Regarding the question whether the Qur?anic account of creation is incompatible with man having evolved, if evolution entails, as Darwin believed, that ?probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from one primordial form, into which life was first breathed? (455), I apprehend that this is incompatible with the Qur?anic account of creation. Our first ancestor was the prophet Adam (upon whom be peace), who was created by Allah in Jannah, or ?paradise? and not on earth, but also created in a particular way that He describes to us:

[And [mention] when your Lord said to the angels, ?Truly, I will create a man from clay. So when I have completed him, and breathed into him of My spirit, then fall down prostrate to him.? And the angels prostrated, one and all. Save for Satan, who was too proud to, and disbelieved. He said to him, ?O Satan, what prevented you from prostrating to what I have created with My two hands? Are you arrogant, or too exalted?? He said, ?I am better than he; You created me from fire and created him from clay.?] (Saad 38:71-76)

Now, the God of Islam is transcendently above any suggestion of anthropomorphism, and Qur?anic exegetes like Fakhr Ad-Din Ar-Razi explain the above words ?created with My two hands? as a figurative expression of Allah?s special concern for this particular creation, the first human, since a sovereign of immense majesty does not undertake any work ?with his two hands? unless it is of the greatest importance (Ar-Razi vol. 26, 231?232). I say ?the first human? because the Arabic term bashar used in the verse [Truly, I will create a man from clay] means precisely a human being and has no other lexical significance.

The same interpretive considerations (of Allah?s transcendence above the attributes of created things) apply to the words [and breathed into him of My spirit]. Because the Qur?an unequivocally establishes that Allah is Ahad or ?One,? not an entity divisible into parts, exegetes say this ?spirit? was a created one, and that its attribution to Allah (?My spirit?) is what is called in Arabic idafat at-tashrif ?an attribution of honor,? showing that the ruh or ?spirit? within this first human being and his descendants was ?a sacred, exalted, and noble substance? (Ar-Razi 228)?not that there was a ?part of Allah? such as could enter into Adam?s body, which is unbelief. Similar attributions are not infrequent in Arabic, just as the Ka`bah is called bayt Allah, or ?the House of Allah,? meaning ?Allah?s honored house,? not that it is His address; or such as the she-camel sent to the people of Thamud, which was called naqat Allah, or ?the she-camel of Allah,? meaning ?Allah?s honored she-camel,? signifying its inviolability in the Shari`ah of the time, not that He rode it; and so on.

All of which shows that, according to the Qur?an, human beings are intrinsically?by their celestial provenance in Jannah, by their specially created nature, and by the ruh or soul within them?at a quite different level in Allah?s eyes than other terrestrial life, whether or not their bodies have certain physiological affinities with it, which are the prerogative of their Maker to create. Darwin says

I believe that animals have descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number. Analogy would lead me one step further, namely, to the belief that all animals and plants have descended from some one prototype. But analogy may be a deceitful guide. (454?455)

Indeed it may. It is the nature of the place in which Allah has created us, this world (dunya), that the possibility exists to deny the existence of Allah, His angels, His Books, His messengers, the Last Day, and destiny, its good and evil. If these things were not hidden by a veil, there would be no point in Allah?s making us responsible for believing them. Belief would be involuntary, like the belief, say, that France is in Europe.

But what He has made us responsible for is precisely belief in the unseen. Why? In order that the divine names?such as Ar-Rafi` or ?He Who Raises,? Al-Khafidh ?He Who Abases,? Al-Mu`ti ?He Who Gives,? Al-Mani` ?He Who Withholds,? Al-Rahim ?the Merciful,? Al-Muntaqim ?the Avenger,? Al-Latif ?the Subtlely Kind,? and so on?may be manifest.

How are they manifest? Only through the levels of human felicity and perdition, of salvation and damnation, by the disparity of human spiritual attainment in all its degrees: from the profound certitude of the prophets (upon whom be peace), to the faith of the ordinary believer, to the doubts of the waverer or hypocrite, to the denials of the damned. Also, the veil for its part has a seamless quality. To some, it is a seamless veil of light manifesting the Divine through the perfection of creation; while to others, it is a seamless veil of darkness, a perfect nexus of interpenetrating causal relations in which there is no place for anything that is not material. Allah says

[Exalted in grace is He in Whose hand is dominion, and He has power over everything. Who created death and life to try you, as to which of you is better in works, and He is the All-Powerful, the Oft-Forgiving. And Who created the seven heavens in layers; you see no disparity in the creation of the All-Merciful. Return your glance: Do you see any fissures?] (Al-Mulk 67:1-3)

The last time I checked, the university scene was an atheistic subculture, of professors and students actively or passively convinced that God was created by man. In bastions of liberalism like the University of California at Berkeley, for example, which still forbids the establishment of a Religions Department, only this attitude will do; anything else is immature, is primitivism. The reduction of human behavior to evolutionary biology is a major journalistic missionary outreach of this movement. I am pleased with this, in as much as Allah has created it to try us, to distinguish the good from the bad, the bad from the worse. But I don?t see why Muslims should accept it as an explanation of the origin of man, especially when it contradicts what we know from the Creator of Man.

Other Species

As for other cases, change from one sort of thing to another does not seem to contradict revelation, for Allah says, [O people: Fear your Lord, Who created you from one soul [Adam, upon whom be peace] and created from it its mate [his wife Hawwa?], and spread forth from them many men and women] (Qur?an An-Nisaa? 4:1) and also says, concerning the metamorphosis of a disobedient group of Banu Isra?il into apes, [When they were too arrogant to [desist from] what they had been forbidden, We said to them, ?Be you apes, humiliated?] (Al-A`raf 7:166).

And in a hadith we are told, ?There shall be groups of people from my community who shall consider fornication, silk, wine, and musical instruments to be lawful: groups shall camp beside a high mountain, whom a shepherd returning to in the evening with one of their herds shall approach for something he needs, and they shall tell him, ?Come back tomorrow.? Allah shall destroy them in the night, bringing down the mountain upon them, and transforming others into apes and swine until the Day of Judgment? (Al-Bukhari 7.138:5590). Most Islamic scholars have understood these transformations literally, which shows that Allah?s changing one thing into another (again, in other than the origin of man) has not been traditionally considered to be contrary to the teachings of Islam. Indeed, the daily miracle of nutrition, the sustenance Allah provides for His creatures, in which one creature is transformed into another by being eaten, may be seen in the food chains that make up the economy of our natural world, as well as our own plates.

If, as in the theory of evolution, we conjoin with this possibility the factors of causality, gradualism, mutation, and adaptation, it does not seem to me to add anything radically different to these other forms of change. For Islamic tenets of faith do not deny causal relations as such, but rather that causes have effects in and of themselves, for to believe this is to ascribe a co-sharer to Allah in His actions. Whoever believes in this latter causality (as virtually all evolutionists do) is an unbeliever (kafir) without any doubt, as ?whoever denies the existence of ordinary causes has made the wisdom of Allah Most High inoperative, while whoever attributes effects to them has associated co-sharers (shirk) to Allah Most High? (Al-Hashimi 33). As for Muslims, they believe that Allah alone creates causes, Allah alone creates effects, and Allah alone conjoins the two. In the words of the Qur?an, [Allah is the Creator of everything] (Ar-Ra`d 13:16).

A Muslim should pay careful attention to this point, and distance himself from believing either that causes (1) bring about effects in and of themselves; or (2) bring about effects in and of themselves through a capacity Allah has placed in them. Both of these negate the oneness and soleness (wahdaniyya) of Allah, which entails that Allah has no co-sharer in:

1. His entity (dhat)

2. His attributes (sifat)

3. Or in His acts (af`al ), which include the creation of the universe and everything in it, including all its cause and effect relationships.

This third point is negated by both (1) and (2) above, and perhaps this is what your pamphleteer at Oxford had in mind when he spoke about the shirk (ascribing a co-sharer to Allah) of evolution.

In this connection, evolution as a knowledge claim about a causal relation does not seem to me intrinsically different from other similar knowledge claims, such as the statement ?The president died from an assassin?s bullet.? Here, though in reality Allah alone gives life or makes to die, we find a dispensation in Sacred Law to speak in this way, provided that we know and believe that Allah alone brought about this effect. As for someone who literally believes that the bullet gave the president death, such a person is a kafir. In reality he knows no more about the world than a man taking a bath who, when the water is cut off from the municipality, gets angry at the tap.

To summarize the answer to the question on evolution thus far, belief in macro-evolutionary transformation and variation of non-human species does not seem to me to entail kufr (unbelief) or shirk (ascribing co-sharers to Allah) unless one also believes that such transformation came about by random mutation and natural selection, understanding these adjectives as meaning causal independence from the will of Allah. You have to look in your heart and ask yourself what you believe. From the point of view of tawheed, Islamic theism, nothing happens ?at random,? there is no ?autonomous nature,? and anyone who believes in either of these is necessarily beyond the pale of Islam.

Unfortunately, this seems to be exactly what most evolutionists think. In America and England, they are the ones who write the textbooks, which raises weighty moral questions about sending Muslim students to schools to be taught these atheistic premises as if they were ?givens of modern science.? Teaching unbelief (kufr) to Muslims as though it were a fact is unquestionably unlawful. Is this unlawfulness mitigated (made legally permissible by Shari`ah standards) by the need (darura) of upcoming generations of Muslims for scientific education? If so, the absence of textbooks and teachers in most schools who are conversant and concerned enough with the difficulties of the theory of evolution to accurately present its hypothetical character, places a moral obligation upon all Muslim parents. They are obliged to monitor their children?s Islamic beliefs and to explain to them (by means of themselves, or someone else who can) the divine revelation of Islam, together with the difficulties of the theory of evolution that will enable the children to make sense of it from an Islamic perspective and understand which aspects of the theory are rejected by Islamic theism (tawheed) and which are acceptable. The question of the theory?s adequacy, meaning its generalizability to all species, will necessarily be one of the important aspects of this explanation.


Of all the premises of evolution, the two that we have characterized above as unbelief (kufr), namely, random mutation and natural selection, interpreted in a materialistic sense, are what most strongly urge its generalization to man. Why must we accept that man came from a common ancestor with animal primates, particularly since a fossil record of intermediate forms is not there? The answer of our age seems to be ?Where else should he have come from??

It is only if we accept the premise that there is no God that this answer acquires any cogency. The Qur?an answers this premise in detail and with authority. But evolutionary theory is not only ungeneralizable because of Allah informing us of His own existence and man?s special creation, but because of what we discern in ourselves of the uniqueness of man, as the Qur?an says,

[We shall show them Our signs on the horizons and in themselves, until it is plain to them that it is the Truth] (Fussilat 41:53).

Among the greatest of these signs in man?s self is his birthright as khalifat Ar-Rahman, ?the vicegerent of the All-Merciful.? If it be wondered what this vicegerency consists in, the ulama of tasawwuf, the scholars of Islamic spirituality, have traditionally answered that it is to be looked for in the ma`rifa bi Llah or ?knowledge of Allah? that is the prerogative of no other being in creation besides the believer, and which is attained through following the path of inward purification, of strengthening the heart?s attachment to Allah through acts of obedience specified by Sacred Law, particularly that of dhikr.

The locus of this attachment and this knowledge is not the mind, but rather the subtle faculty within one that is sometimes called the heart, sometimes the ruh or spirit. Allah?s special creation of this faculty has been mentioned above in connection with the Qur?anic words [and breathed into him of My spirit]. According to masters of the spiritual path, this subtle body is knowledgeable, aware, and cognizant, and when fully awakened, capable of transcending the opacity of the created universe to know Allah. The Qur?an says about it, by way of exalting its true nature through its very unfathomability,

[Say: The spirit is of the matter of my Lord] (Al-Israa? 17:85)

How does it know Allah? I once asked this question of one of the ulama of tasawwuf in Damascus, and recorded his answer in an unpublished manuscript. He told me

Beholding the Divine (mushahada) is of two sorts, that of the eye and that of the heart. In this world, the beholding of the heart is had by many of the ?arifin (knowers of Allah), and consists of looking at contingent things, created beings, that they do not exist through themselves, but rather exist through Allah, and when the greatness of Allah occurs to one, contingent things dwindle to nothing in one?s view, and are erased from one?s thought, and the Real (Al-Haqq) dawns upon one?s heart, and it is as if one beholds. This is termed ?the beholding of the heart.? The beholding of the eye [in this world] is for the Chosen, the Prophet alone, Muhammad (Allah bless him and give him peace). As for the next world, it shall be for all believers. Allah Most High says,

[On that day faces shall be radiant, gazing upon their Lord] (Qur?an Al-Qiymah 75:22)

[I wrote of the above:] If it be observed that the term heart as used above does not seem to conform to its customary usage among speakers of the language, I must grant this. In the context, the term denotes not the mind, but rather the faculty that perceives what is beyond created things, in the world of the spirit, which is a realm unto itself. If one demands that the existence of this faculty be demonstrated, the answer?however legitimate the request?cannot exceed, ?Go to masters of the discipline, train, and you will be shown.? Unsatisfying though this reply may be, it does not seem to me to differ in principle from answers that would be given, for example, to a non-specialist regarding the proof for a particular proposition in theoretical physics or symbolic logic. Nor are such answers an objection to the in-principle ?publicly observable? character of observation statements in these disciplines, but rather a limitation pertaining to the nature of the case and the questioner, one that he may accept, reject, or do something about. (Keller 1?2)

Mere imagination? On the contrary, everything besides this knowledge is imagination, for the object of this knowledge is Allah, true reality, which cannot be transient but is unchanging, while other facts are precisely imaginary. The child you used to be, for example, exists now only in your imagination; the person who ate your breakfast this morning no longer exists except in your imagination; your yesterday, your tomorrow, your today (except, perhaps, for the moment you are presently in, which has now fled): all is imaginary, and only hypostatized as phenomenal reality, as unity, as facticity, as real?through imagination. Every moment that comes is different, winking in and out of existence, preserved in its relational continuum by pure imagination, which constitutes it as ?world.? What we notice of this world is thus imaginary, like what a sleeper sees. In this connection, `Ali ibn Abi Talib (Allah ennoble his countenance) has said, ?People are asleep, and when they die, they awaken? (As-Sakhawi, 442:1240).

This is not to denigrate the power of imagination; indeed, if not for imagination, we could not believe in the truths of the afterlife, Paradise, Hell, and everything that our eternal salvation depends upon. Rather, I mention this in the context of the question of evolution as a cautionary note against a sort of ?fallacy of misplaced concrescence,? an unwarranted epistemological overconfidence, that exists in many people who work in what they term ?the hard sciences.?

As someone from the West, I was raised from early school years as a believer not only in science, the practical project of discovery that aims at exploiting more and more of the universe by identification, classification, and description of micro- and macro-causal relations; but also in scientism, the belief that this enterprise constitutes absolute knowledge. As one philosopher whom I read at the University of Chicago put it, ?Scientism is science?s belief in itself: that is, the conviction that we can no longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with science? (Habermas 4).

It seems to me that this view, in respect to evolution but also in respect to the nature of science as a contemporary religion, represents a sort of defeat of knowledge by an absolutism of pure methodology. As I mentioned at the outset, the categories of understanding that underly every observation statement in the theory of evolution arise from human consciousness, and as such cannot be distinguished by the theory from other transient survival devices: Its explanative method, from first to last, is necessarily only another survival mechanism that has evolved in the animal kingdom. By its own measure, it is not necessary that it be true, but only necessary that it be powerful in the struggle for survival. Presumably, any other theory?even if illusory?that had better implications for survival could displace evolution as a mode of explanation. Or perhaps the theory itself is an illusion.

These considerations went through my mind at the University of Chicago during my ?logic of scientific explanation? days. They made me realize that my faith in scientism and evolutionism had something magical as its basis, the magic of an influential interpretation supported by a vast human enterprise. I do not propose that science should seriously try to comprehend itself, which it is not equipped to do anyway, but I have come to think that, for the sake of its consumers, it might have the epistemological modesty to ?get back,? from its current scientistic pretentions to its true nature, as one area of human interpretation among others. From being the ?grand balance scale? on which one may weigh and judge the ?reality? of all matters, large and small?subsuming ?the concept of God,? for example, under the study of religions, religions under anthropology, anthropology under human behavioral institutions, human behavioral institutions under evolutionary biology, evolutionary biology under organic chemistry, organic chemistry (ultimately) under cosmology, cosmology under chaos theory, and so on?I have hopes that science will someday get back to its true role, the production of technically exploitable knowledge for human life. That is, from pretentions to ?ilm or ?knowledge? to its true role as fann or ?technique.?

In view of the above considerations of its coherence, logicality, applicability, and adequacy, the theory of the evolution of man from lower forms does not seem to show enough scientific rigor to raise it from being merely an influential interpretation. To show the evolution?s adequacy, for everything it is trying to explain would be to give valid grounds to generalize it to man. In this respect, it is a little like Sigmund Freud?s Interpretation of Dreams, in which he describes examples of dreams that are wish fulfillments, and then concludes that ?all dreams are wish fulfillments.? We still wait to be convinced.

Summary of Islamic Conclusions

Allah alone is Master of Existence. He alone causes all that is to be and not to be. Causes are without effect in themselves, but rather both cause and effect are created by Him. The causes and the effects of all processes, including those through which plant and animal species are individuated, are His work alone. To ascribe efficacy to anything but His action, whether believing that causes (1) bring about effects in and of themselves; or (2) bring about effects in and of themselves through a capacity Allah has placed in them, is to ascribe associates to Allah (shirk). Such beliefs seem to be entailed in the literal understanding of ?natural selection? and ?random mutation,? and other evolutionary concepts, unless we understand these processes as figurative causes, while realizing that Allah alone is the agent. This is apart from the consideration of whether they are true or not.

As for the claim that man has evolved from a non-human species, this is unbelief (kufr) no matter if we ascribe the process to Allah or to ?nature,? because it negates the truth of Adam?s special creation that Allah has revealed in the Qur?an. Man is of special origin, attested to not only by revelation, but also by the divine secret within him, the capacity for ma`rifa or knowledge of the Divine that he alone of all things possesses. By his God-given nature, man stands before a door opening onto infinitude that no other creature in the universe can aspire to. Man is something else.


I realized after writing the above that I had not talked much about the literature on the theory of evolution. Books that have been recommended to me are

1. Evolution: A Theory in Crisis. Michael Denton. Bethesda, Maryland: Adler and Adler Publishers, 1986. Originally published in Great Britain by Burnett Books Ltd. This would probably be the most interesting to a biologist, as it discusses molecular genetics and other scientific aspects not examined above.

2. Enclyclopedia of Ignorance. Ed. Duncan Roland. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1978.

3. Thinking About God. Ruqaiyyah Waris Maqsood. Bloomington, Indiana: American Trust Publications.


Begley, Sharon and John Carey. ?Evolution: Change at a Snail?s Pace.? Newsweek 7 December 1981.

Al-Bukhari. Sahih Al-Bukhari. 9 vols. Cairo 1313/1895. Reprint (9 vols. in 3). Beirut: Dar al-Jil, n.d.

Darwin, Charles. The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. Ed. J.W. Burrow. London: Penguin Books, 1979.

Habermas, Jurgen. Knowledge and Human Interests. Tr. Jeremy J. Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

Al-Hashimi. Miftah al-Janna fi Sharh ?Aqida Ahl as-Sunnah. Damascus: Matba`a at-taraqi, 1379/1960.

Keller, Nuh Ha Mim. Interpreter?s Log. Manuscript Draft, 1993.

Ar-Razi, Fakhr Ad-Din Ar-Razi. Tafsir Al-Fakhr Ar-Razi. 32 vols. Beirut 1401/1981. Reprint (32 vols. in 16). Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1405/1985.

As-Sakhawi. Al-Maqasid al-Hasana. Cairo 1375/1956. Reprint. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyya, 1399/1979.

As-Sanusi. Hashiya ad-Dasuqi ?ala Umm al-Barahin. Cairo n.d. Reprint. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, n.d.

  • This work first appeared on http://www.masud.co.uk. It is reproduced with minor stylistic changes with kind permission. The work was originally a letter made into a treatise.
  • * Nuh Ha Mim Keller is an American Muslim translator and specialist in Islamic Law. Born in 1954 in the northwestern United States, he

was educated in philosophy and Arabic at the University of Chicago and University of California at Los Angeles. He entered Islam in 1977 at Al-Azhar in Cairo and later studied the traditional Islamic sciences of Hadith, Shafi`i and Hanafi jurisprudence, legal methodology (usul al-fiqh), and tenets of faith (`aqeedah) in Syria and Jordan, where he has lived since 1980. His English translation of `Umdat as-Salik [The Reliance of the Traveller] (1250 pp., Sunna Books, 1991) is the first Islamic legal work in a European language to receive the certification of Al-Azhar, the Muslim world?s oldest institution of higher learning. He also possesses ijazas or ?certificates of authorization? in Islamic jurisprudence from sheikhs in Syria and Jordan.
The works posted on this page reflect solely the opinions of the authors.

Islam and Civil State

By Saadedine El `Othmani

** Oct 25, 2005

Diversity of the Prophetic Actions Actions of the Prophet as an Imam Creating the Civil State

The relationship between the universal and legal, between the religious and positive laws in our culture, all come to the forefront in relation to issues that require further discussion and examination. This process should be accompanied by a new perspective which is capable of generating a new vision that takes us away from the narrow spaces of contradiction and discord to the vastness of harmony and integration. This methodology sheds new light on these Prophetic actions that have escaped thorough examination. I, therefore, raise a question related on how far are Islam and Islamic communities harmonious with a civil statewhere legitimacy is based on the peoples will and where laws are issued by institutions authorized by means of elections Institutions that pass laws in the interest of the people and with the maximum objectivity possible. To answer this question, I chose to highlight the actions of Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) as a state leader (an imam) and the features of this imamate (state leadership) as described by classical scholars of usul al-fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence). This methodology sheds new light on these Prophetic actions that have escaped thorough examination, in relation to developing the contemporary Muslim political experience. This will contribute to freeing contemporary Muslims from the shackles of confining ourselves to certain historical experiences, which might restrain a breakthrough that could benefit us from the contemporary human experience.

Diversity of the Prophetic Actions
The Prophet’s actions have been described by many as one dimensional actions that are all divinely inspired. However, several jurists and classical scholars of usul al-fiqh refuted this view and believed that it is contradictory to the nature of the Prophet’s actions. Some scholars proposed divisions for the Prophet’s actions. Chief among these scholars are Abi Muhammad Ibn Qutaybah Al-Dinori (d. AH 276) in his book Ta’wil Mukhtalaf al-Hadith (Figurative Interpretation of the Different Prophetic Traditions); Al-Qadi `Iyad Al-Yahsebi (d. AH 544) in his book Al-Shifa bi Ta`rif Huquq al-Mustafa (The Healing by the Rights of the Recognition of the Chosen One); Ibn Al-Qayyim Al-Jawziah (d. AH 751) in several writings; and the Indian scholar Shah Wali Allah Al-Dahlwi (d. AH 1176) in his book Hujat Allah al-Baleghah.

Some scholars proposed divisions for the Prophet’s actions.

Sheikh Muhammad Al-Taher ibn `Ahsour, author of Maqasid al-Shari`ah al-Islamiah, was among the contemporary scholars who made valuable contributions in this field. Yet the pioneer scholar of principles of jurisprudence Shihab Al-Din Al-Qarafi (d. AH 684) was the most elaborative on the different types of the Prophet’s actions. He illustrated these visions in several books of his such as his encyclopedia of Fiqh named Az-Zakhirah, and his book is well known for illustrating these different categories. Finally, there is his specialized book on the subject entitled Al-Ihkam fi Tamiez al-Fatwa `an al-Hakam wa Tasarufat al-Qadi wa al-Imam. Based on these accumulative efforts, the Prophet’s actions can be generally divided into:

1. Legislative actions. Actions performed by Prophet Muhammad for the sake of setting a model to be emulated and followed. These legislative actions are divided into

a. Actions of general legislation.
These are intended for the whole Ummah until the Last Day. These actions are either reported or given as fatwas.
b. Actions of special legislation. These are related to a specific place, time, status, or person and are not general for the whole Ummah. These actions include judicial, imamate, and private actions. These actions are only binding on the person they were directed to and not on others. They are described by some as partial actions or partial legislations or partial discourses.

2. Non-legislative actions. Actions that are not meant to set a model to be followed, neither by the Ummah nor by those to whom it was directed. Among these actions are the instinctual actions, actions concerned with daily life, instructive actions, and private actions. Such division has its positive influence in understanding religion and dealing with Prophetic traditions against a common one-sided approach of handling these issues often by people who did not understand the sayings and actions except from one perspective and considered them all of the same nature. They confined the sayings within the framework of the wordings and the linguistic structures, not considering the surrounding circumstances and context. They disregarded the fact that many of the Prophets actions were responsive to new givens and were related more or less to special cases. Let alone that such an approach as not paid due care to the purpose of the Prophets actions and the related legislative, educational, and preaching objectives. In this context, the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) turns into abstract principles and rules that have nothing to do with the dynamic reality, the complexity of human life, or the new givens taking place as time goes by. Such approach considers the Sunnah as a legislation that is formulated in an abstract world that has nothing to do with the variables of a specific political or social reality and which is remote even from human nature. This explains why Shihab Ad-Din Al-Qarafi rendered the differentiation between the different types of the Prophets actions as one of the legislative origins that are worth attention and consideration. Having illustrated the different types of the Prophetic actions and the differences between them, he stated that based on this formula and on these differences, whatever comes to you under this subject can be distinguished in his actions (peace and blessings be upon him), so look closely into this, for it is one of the fundamentals of the religion. Ibn Al-Qayyim Jawziyyah also stated an important rule: “Prophetic sayings that are partial and private should not be considered as general [rules], nor should the general ones be considered as private, then fault and contradiction will befall.”

Actions of the Prophet as an Imam

The actions of the Prophet as an imam are defined as those actions of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) as a leader of the state: one who manages the state affairs in a way that maintains its interests and warding off any kind of evil. The Prophet, as a leader, took the necessary decisions and procedures to achieve the objectives of Shari`ah in society. Some scholars describe these actions as those of Shari`ah-based policy or that of the leadership of the state. Some classical scholars of principles of Islamic jurisprudence tackled the context within which the Prophet’s action took place, in our case here, in relation to state leadership. The Prophet’s actions of leadership, as described by Al-Qarafi, are supplementary to other Prophetic actions, divine inspirations, religious legislations, and legal judgments. It follows that Prophetic leadership does not fall into the same state as that of prophetic actions and delivering the divine message. The difference mainly is twofold:

1. The imam, as Al-Qarafi mentions, is the person “authorized to manage the public policy of the people and interests, to ward off evil, to repress criminals, to execute despots, and to accommodate citizens in the territory.”
2. The imam is entitled executive power. This authority is not given to either the mufti or the judge. The fulfilling of the role imamate, by definition, “is meant to include power and governance.” It is important in this regard to examine the Prophetic actions with regard to imamate, to highlight the objective perspective that the classical scholars of principles of jurisprudence insist on taking in relation to this issue. The four most important categories of the Prophetic leadership are discussed below.

1. Special Legislative Actions The Prophetic actions of leadership, which are not based on the revelation, are special partial actions related to the managing the status and the policy of the society, in a special time, place, and circumstances. Hence, Ibn Al-Qayyim described them as a partial policy, according to the implied interests of the Ummah at that time and place and in the light of special circumstances. Al-Taher ibn `Ashour names them partial legislations. The Prophetic actions of leadership, which are not based on the revelation, are special partial actions related to the managing the status and the policy of the society Hence they are not binding to the whole Ummah ad infinitum, and leaders and imams, who follow the Prophet, should not blindly uphold them. Rather, they should follow the methodology and pay more attention to the fulfillment of interests that were given due care by Prophet Muhammad in that circumstantial context. Al-Qarafi illustrated that this type of Prophetic action should not be emulated unless upon the approval of the present imam because he (peace and blessings be upon him) did it under his imamate; no permission to follow this type of action without his [the leader’s] approval. Accordingly, these actions related to state leadership have to be referred to the imam or the concerned parties in the society, who make sure that objectives of Shari`ah are taken into consideration and that interests are maintained, as Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) did, with full consideration to the particular place, time, and circumstances of the situation. Inflexible rigidity to these actions, disregarding the need for change, runs counter to the objectives of Shari`ah as well as to the Sunnah itself. For instance, if we consider the Prophet’s saying, “Anyone who cultivates untended land owns it,” this tradition is considered by scholars who see it in the light of political leadership as an authorization during the lifetime of the Prophet to give the right of ownership of land to anyone who cultivates it. After his death, this authorization lay within the authority of the leader or any other concerned party to prevent or to organize such a system according to circumstantial interests. This is the meaning of Imam Abu Hanifa’s saying “no cultivating [and claiming] unattended land except with the permission of the imam.” The saying of Prophet Muhammad that ‘whoever kills a [combatant] person [in the state of war] loots him’ is, according to al-Qarafi, an action related to contemporary interest as he (peace and blessings be upon him) only said it because this situation necessitated that [action], so to encourage people to fight.” This is why Al-Qarafi states, whenever the imam sees this [hadith] as an interest, he should use it. Whenever it is not in of interest, he should not. This is what we mean by an action related to imamate.

2. Actions Related to Public Interest The second important feature of actions of imamate is the fact that these actions aim at the attainment of public interest. Al-`Ezz ibn `Abdul-Salam clarifies that if it were not for the imam, public interests would have been lost and public harm would have occurred. The defining characteristic for the head of state (or imam) is, according to Al-Qarafi, to be aware of managing the interests and the politics of ruling the people. Similarly, as judiciary relies on pretexts, evidence, and proofsissuing fatwas is based upon legal evidenceleadership actions rely on preferred or absolute interest of rights of the Ummah. This is because the imam is the one who is delegated to handle the public policy of the people, manage the public interest, prevent the occurrence of harm, fight off criminals, execute tyrants, and accommodate the people. Actions of imamate aim at the attainment of public interest. Prophet Muhammad once prohibited the storage of meat of the sacrificial animal for more than three nights by saying store only for three [days] and give away the rest. However, the next year he said, I said so to distribute to the needy Arabs visiting Madinah, but now, eat, give to charity, and store what you want. Prophet Muhammad prohibited the storage of meat for more than three nights in the first year as he was considering the economic and living conditions due to the large numbers of people coming to Madinah. He meant by this order to solve the crisis and alleviate pressures. `Aishah even mentioned in another saying, He [the Prophet] only said that in that year when people were starving. So he wanted the rich to feed the poor. This public interest was taken into consideration when dealing with legal rulings. Ahmad Muhammad Shakir considers that this action on the part of Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) is an action of a leader or a ruler in relation to dealing with peoples interest and is not taken as a rule of legislation in public matters.

3. Actions Related to Personal Reasoning When Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) was transmitting Allahs words or clarifying matters of religion, he did so according to what was divinely inspired; whereas when he made a decision as an imam or a political leader, he always worked according to his personal reasoning (ijtihad), which was subject to right or wrong. The second matter is agreed upon by all classical scholars of principles of jurisprudence and jurists. That concept was reported by Muhammad ibn Ali Al-Shawkani: It is agreed upon among Muslim scholars that prophets may resort to personal reasoning in relation to daily affairs, wars, and the like. Such consensus was told by Selim Al-Razi and Ibn Hazam; the same was actually done by our Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) when deciding to effect a reconciliation with [the tribe of] Ghatfan regarding the issue of Madinah fruits, and when he suggested not to pollinate Madinah plants. Abu Bakr Al-Jasas, Abu Al-Hassan Al-Basri, Imam al-Juwayni, and Fakharu Al-Din Al-Razi favor this opinion. The same was emphasized by Ibn Battah through Taqi Al-Din Ibn Taymiyah: The Prophet was held responsible by Allah for some of his decisions and orders, and this is a clear evidence that many of them were based on independent views and judgment. This applies to the Prophet’s judgment on matters like Badr captives, agreeing to taking their redemption, and permitting people who came to him with whatever excuse to be discharged from the Tabuk battle, until others with no excuse discharged themselves. Also the verse [consult them about the matter] (Aal `Imran 3:159). If that judgment was divine inspiration, then the Prophet would not have needed consultation. The aforementioned clarifies a lot of the Prophet’s political actions and decisions, and points out that many of them were based on mere personal reasoning. Consulting his Companions in his decisions is a further evidence that the Prophet’s actions as an imam were based on personal reasoning. If the issue had been a matter of divine inspiration, he would not have resorted to consultation. Actually, he listened to their opinions, consulted experts, and contemplated and discussed matters willingly. The Companions used to distinguish between his role as a conveyer of a message and divine inspiration and his role as a political and military leader. If they were confused, they would ask the Prophet for clarification. An example of that was the question of Al-Hubab ibn Munzir when he asked the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) about the location chosen in Badr: Is it a place chosen by Allah or is it a matter of opinion, war, and maneuver Another example was evident in the question of Sa`d ibn Mu`adh and Sa`d ibn `Ubadah in the battle of the Khandaq (Trench): O Messenger, is it a matter you prefer and so we will do it, an order of Allah we have to obey, or an action you do for our favor.

4. Actions Related to Non-Religious Matters. A term used by Al-Qarafi to illustrate that personal reasoning of the leaders is only appropriate when related to whatever is disputed over worldly interests. He added, “this inevitably excludes personal reasoning in matters of rituals (`ibadat), since debate over them is related to the Hereafters affairs and not to everyday-life matters; thus, naturally, there is no room in them for independent reasoning on the part of the ruler. Differentiation between matters of this world and those of the Hereafter is of key importance; it should, however, be understood within the Islamic comprehensive outlook of the relation between the religious and worldly matters and not within a framework of an ecclesiastical matter from a Western outlook. Here, we put the religious between quotation marks because the term religion has two meanings in Shari`ah texts. The first meaning comprises all the activities and pursuits related to Muslim life, politics included. Any righteous deed effected by a Muslim is generally an act of worship and a kind of a charitable deed as long as the intentions are merely for Allahs sake. The aforementioned can be listed under the term religion. Fiqh books dealing with practical religious judgments include chapters on prayers, fasting, and zakah, in addition to judgments related to family affairs, marriage, divorce, and inheritance. They also include judgments related to economic activity such as sales, usury, mortgage, crop-sharing, and tenancy, in addition to chapters related to political activity such as imamate, enjoining the good and forbidding evil, jihad, and the mobilization of the army. The aforementioned are deemed as matters of religion, that is to say that religion is any and every useful righteous act effected by the Muslim. What’s religious is actions based on divine inspiration or on reasoning in matters related to religion that are equivalent to the status of inspiration. The second meaning is specific: meaning the opposite to worldly life. It was mentioned in one of the Prophets sayings If it is a matter of religion, I am for it; if it is a worldly matter, make your affair. The meaning of “religion” as meant here is evident in the following saying. Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) saw people standing beside some palms and asked what they were doing. They said, They are cross pollinating. Then he said, I think it will be of no effect. They accordingly left the operation, and hence the palms stopped bearing fruits. Taking knowledge of that, he said, Go on if it is useful for you. I only assumed it. So dont take me up on my opinion in this matter as an order. Follow my words if I am talking about Allah, as I would never lie about Allah. In another saying, Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) said, If I make an order in matters of religion, then take it. And if I make an order based on my own judgment, then consider that I am a human. What’s religious is actions based on divine inspiration or on reasoning in matters related to religion that are equivalent to the status of inspiration. What’s worldly is actions based on reasoning with worldly matters are mere opinion or personal judgment. Underscoring the Prophets actions of leadership in the light of worldly interests is significant for the coming reasons: This excludes them from the second meaning of religion. This proves the existence of clear distinction in Islam between religion and life, political activity and mere religious acts. This clarifies Islams intentions to strip political activity of any kind of holiness, so as to stop monopoly in the name of religion and unfetter restrictions imposed on creativity and freedom. Such distinction is also meant to clarify that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) inevitably altered his actions as an imam in case that a change happened in the public interests on which they are based. Such understanding is unanimously agreed upon. Some Prophetic actions as an imam are not binding for any legislative body, and we may not just stick to them on the presumption that they are Sunnah. Concerned parties ought to follow the approach and method adopted by the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) based on consideration of legitimate public interests. No one is to make judgments based upon such actions unless he is in a position of management and legislation. When Ibn Al-Qayyim reported some of the actions of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and caliphs with regards to Shari`ah-oriented policy, he mentioned that such is a temporary policy, changing according to interests and ages. Some considered these actions as an ever-binding public legislation; everyone has their excuses and reward. Everyone who works on interpreting such matters for sake of Allah and His Messenger has either single or double that reward. Creating the Civil State The Prophets actions as an imam with regards to Shari`ah-based policy have given vent for renovation of political fiqh and for reconsidering many of its issues. They also set the basis for a methodological awareness of Shari`ah-based policy and propagate such awareness among those interested in the Islamic revival, theoretically and practically. The distinction in Islam between what is inspired and what is created by man is principally clear and natural, especially in relation to matters connected to political activity.

An insightful understanding of the Prophets actions as an imam offers a key and solid systematic base for many of the current issues related to modern Islamic political thought, some of which are mentioned in the following:

1. A sound understanding of the Prophets actions as an imamwhich are unbindingoffers a key and rigorous systematic base for many of the current issues related to modern Islamic political trends of thought. Characteristics of the Prophetic actions as an imam point out that the Islamic state is essentially civil and not a religious one as deemed in the Western political approach. The nature and characteristics of the Prophets actions as an imam stress that Islam attributes no holiness to practices and decisions of leaders, or to methods adopted by the state to manage the Ummahs affairs. The state in Islam is not theocratic, as there is no state that is inspired by transcendental powers or by revelation. The state in Islam is a worldly state, one whose decisions are human and whose duty is to adopt the best of subjective and practical policies to manage affairs of society. A leader in Islam does not acquire legitimacy from a transcendental power; he is an ordinary person willingly authorized and chosen by the Ummah of which he is representative and before which he is liable. He is, above all, liable for each and every action before Allah. Classical Muslim political jurists highlighted such meanings when defining Shari`ah-oriented policy or the functions of imam in Islam. Some of their opinions are, however, misunderstood. Abu Al Hasan Al-Mawardi defined imamate as a deputyship on behalf of the prophethood in protecting religion and worldly politics. Ibn Khaldun said, It is an authorization to protect religion and worldly politics. Then he said, as for calling him a caliph, it is because he is a successor to the Prophet in handling the affairs of the Ummah. Succession of prophethood might convey some ambiguity on the meaning of imamate. However, the nature of Prophetic actions in this regard clarifies that the people of authority are to succeed the Prophet in his position as a leader, which he handles using his human characteristics and in which he practiced independent political practices, in relation to which he is not infallible. Yet, according to the consensus of the Muslim scholars, Muslim leaders don’t succeed the Prophet in the prophethood, which entails conveying the message and the Prophet is infallible in this regard.

2. The relation between what is religious and what is political has taken different and contradictory forms in contemporary thought. This applies as well to the West, despite all common grounds between the Muslim experience and the West. It is necessary in this regard to benefit from others experiences in establishing our democratic model. Human political experiences have greatly contributed to achieving stability of their nations and to rationalizing peoples contribution in the management of the state affairs. An in-depth reading of the Western political experience enables us to reach a model that combines both the religious and the positive laws, one that responds to our special needs and helps us achieve any necessary requirements. This necessitates, in return, the exclusion of any sacredness marking the political aspects of religion, excluding the general principles and the main objectives of Shari`ah. The remaining is a human, worldly matter, and the Prophets actions of leadership in this context are purely human. Muslim constitutional jurists (ancient and contemporary alike) agree that the Ummah or the people is the origin of legitimacy for the state. Prophet Muhammad himself (peace and blessings be upon him) died without appointing a successor. He (peace and blessings be upon him) totally left the matter for people not only to select the person they want, but also to choose the method of selection. Such action on the part of the Prophet constitutes a meaningful constitutional precedent. Leaders are chosen only by their people; agreement of pledge of allegiance is a contract concluded between the ruler and the ruled, where total consent is the main condition without which the contract is null and void. The ruler, after all, is one individual selected from the Ummah to manage power; he is not privileged as a result of that selection, and he should act according to the contract concluded. Classical and contemporary scholars alike contributed several arguments in this regard. Yet I mention only Imam Shafi`is argumentation. He usually refers to the Prophets saying No prayer is accepted from an imam (prayer leader) hated by people He concluded that it is discouraged for a person to be an imam to a group of people who hate him. Then he applied such principle to the political aspect: It is disliked for a person to rule people who hate him. And if he does while the majority does not hate him and the minority do, I say it still is so, for the principle of disliking running for wilayiah (ruling) in general. It is undoubtedly a splendid inference; if it is unaccepted to be an imam for people hating the imam, the same can be applied to the principle of ruling. It is disliked for a person to rule people who hate him”–Imam Shafi`i. Legitimacy in Islamic history usually depended on the Ummah one way or another. New nations were founded on the ruins of others, which failed either to attain internal justice or stability or to protect the Islamic territory of the Ummah against enemies. Someone was usually motivated to establish a state that could attain both purposes, so people in turn gathered around him, hence giving legitimacy to his rule. This case is reminiscent of the emergence of the nation-state project or other forms state in the Arab world, which were established by a revolution. These states in one way or another responded to popular hopes of liberty and social justice. These states were hence hailed at the beginning, yet they soon turned to states of oppression and coercion for several subjective and objective reasons, and they consequently failed to attain either liberalization or social justice. Relating legitimacy to fulfillment of the Ummahs basic needs was described as religious legitimacy, yet not in the theocratic sense of the word. Rather, this means that the legitimacy of such Ummah is more dependent on the ability to protect the religion and to foster the Islamic Ummah. In other words, it is a civil state, with popular legitimacy, authorized to protect the religion of the Ummah, exactly as modern states undertook responsibility of protecting their people and interests. By the same token, this principle can be applied to other constitutional articles such as the amendment of political institutions, elections, setting the terms for their office, and defining the relation between different authorities, their independence, etc. The aforementioned is subject to independent human reasoning.

3. Dealing with the historicity of the rule of the rightly-guided caliphs: The Islamic experience in the age of the caliphs has always dominated political and legislative contemporary Islamic thought. It is, undoubtedly, an outstanding and superior experience; however, this does not mean that it has any direct implications that surpass its age, place, and the surrounding circumstances. If the Prophets political practices are relative, then the Caliphs experience is definitely relative. If we are obliged to follow in the footsteps of the Prophets general methods as a state leader, without intransigent adherence to partial rulings, we have then to take the rightly-guided caliphs as models only with regards to their following the Prophet, their interaction with the variable Islamic reality, and their application of religious statements. Institutional forms, constitutional mechanisms, legislative and political interpretations during the age of the caliphs are mere human outcome governed by the historical context, cultural circumstances, and milieu of that age. Such legacy should not by any means turn into an indispensable part of religion binding on all Muslims in all ages. Human political thought and culture have always been overwhelmed by some axioms that have influenced the Muslims understanding of the Islamic political system. These axioms hindered Muslims from achieving the purposes of Islam except within limits of human cultural environment available in every age. The Quran, however, is an inspiration from which people benefit in accordance to their potentials, which they will never exhaust its intended teachings. Having an Islamic state as a civil one that derives its legitimacy from its citizens makes Muslims more open to the incessant development of the form of government according to the humanly generated mechanisms and systems. This makes them, as well, more capable of applying the best form of democracy, which they can even further enrich with Islamic principles and values that convey loftiness of belief, and social and human depth upon the endorsed democratic form.

**Saadedine El `Othmani is the Secretary general of the Justice and Development Party in Morocco. The works posted on this page reflect solely the opinions of the authors.
Source: www.islamonline.net

Logistik Bisnis

Konsep logistik sebagai bisnis baru berkembang pada tahun 1950-an. Terutama karena meningkatnya kompleksitas pasokan material dan pengiriman barang seiring meningkatnya rantai-pasokan secara global, sehingga membutuhkan para pakar di bidang ini yang disebut Logistikawan rantai-pasokan (supply-chain logistician). Konsep ini bida didefinisikan sebagai mempunyai barang yang cocok dengan jumlah cocok pada saat yang cocok di tempat yang cocok dalam kondisi yang cocok untuk pelanggan yang cocok dan merupakan ilmu mengenai proses dan menggabungkan semua sektor industri.

Tujuan fungsi logistik adalah mengelola hasil siklus hidup proyek, rantai-pasokan dan efisiensinya. Di bisnis, logistik mungkin memiliki fokus internal (inbound-logistics), atau fokus eksternal (outbound-logistics) meliputi aliran dan penyimpanan material dari titik asal ke titik konsumsi. Fungsi utama logistikawan yang cakap meliputi manajemen persediaan, pembelian, transportasi, pergudangan, konsultasi dan mengorganisasi semua perencanaan kegiatan-kegiatan ini.

Logistikawan menggabungkan pengetahuan profesionapada tiap fungsi sehingga ada koorinasi sumberdaya dala sebuah organisasi. Ada dua bentuk logistik yang berbeda secara mendasar. Pertama adalah pengoptimalan arus material melalui jaringan transportasi dan titik penyimpanan secara stabil. Kedua mengoordinasikan urutan sumberdaya untuk melaksanakan proyek.

~diterjemahkan dari wikipedia

Ikuti jajak-pendapat

Logistik Pihak Ketiga (3PL)

Logisitk Pihak Ketiga  (disingkat 3PL: third-party logistics) merupakan pemanfaatan organisasi eksternal untuk menjalankan kegiatan-kegiatan logistik yang secara tradisional dilakukan di dalam organisasi itu sendiri. Berdasarkan definisi ini maka 3PL meliputi semua bentuk outsourcing kegiatan logistik yang sebelumnya dilakukan di dalam perusahaan. Contohnya jika sebuah perusahaan yang mempunyai fasilitas transportasi sendiri memutuskan untuk memakai jasa pergudangan eksternal, ini merupakan contoh 3PL.

~ diterjemahkan dari wikipedia

Manajemen Logistik

Irfan dan Mujib
Manajemen Logistik adalah bagian Manajemen Rantai Suplai yang merencanakan, menerapkan dan mengendalikan aliran dan penyimpanan barang, jasa dan informasi terkait agar efisien, efektif antara titik asal dan titik konsumsi untuk memenuhi kebutuhan pelanggan.

~diterjemahkan dari wikipedia.org

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